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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of rights in land normally focuses on private
law. A person's tenure in land depends on the validity of title
and possible claims by other persons. Additionally, a person's
title depends on the sovereign from whom title derives. In this
respect, a person's right in land bears a public law character. If
the sovereign lacks a right to the territory, the ownership rights
of individuals may be in doubt.
When sovereignty changes, private rights in land are nor-
mally respected. Thus, when the United States acquired Flor-
ida from Spain, it agreed to respect land grants previously
made by the King of Spain, and the courts of the United States
honored that commitment.1 A different situation arises, how-
ever, when a state assumes not sovereignty but control. This
occurs when a state occupies territory during hostilities.
This distinction between sovereignty and control assumes
importance if an occupying power settles its own citizens in the
occupied territory. As an occupying power in Palestinian terri-
tory since 1967, Israel has settled large numbers of its citizens.
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (AP.L.O.)
have agreed to negotiate an end to their long-running territorial
conflict, and one of the thorniest issues that confronts them is
the future of Israel's settlements. The P.L.O. wants the settle-
ments dismantled. Israel seeks to continue the settlements and
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keep them and the areas in which they are located under its
control in some measure.
That aspiration raises a number of questions. Does Israel
have a right to continue these settlements in existence? Do the
settlers, as individuals, have a right to remain? Do the settlers
have a collective right to remain? Looking at the matter from
the other side, will the Palestine state2 be obliged to allow the
settlers to remain? Do the Palestinian inhabitants have a col-
lective right to see the settlements removed? Do individual
Palestinians have a right to recover their land where settle-
ments have been built against their will?
These matters will be topics of negotiation between the two
parties, and their resolution may be affected by political factors.
Yet the background rules of international law play a role. This
Article explores the rights of not only Israel and Palestine but
also the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian inhabitants. This
Article seeks an outcome consistent with the internationally
guaranteed rights of all parties. In seeking this outcome, no
party will be in a position, after the fact, to object on grounds of
violation of its rights. Such an outcome respects the rights of
the parties and is conducive to long-term mutual accommoda-
tion and peace in the region.
II. ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS
The territories in which Israel has built the settlements in
question are the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan
River. These are two sectors of historic Palestine that Israel
captured during the Six-Day War of 1967. At the time of their
capture, Egypt held the Gaza Strip while Jordan held the West
Bank.
A. Acquisition of the Territory by Israel
The circumstances of Israel's acquisition of the Gaza Strip
and West Bank can be briefly stated. The 1967 military action
started on June 5 between Egypt and Israel. By way of a mu-
tual defense treaty with Egypt, Jordan became involved within
2 The term "state" is used here on the basis that Palestine is the sovereign in
the Gaza Strip and West Bank. See ESTHER COHEN, HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE IS-
RAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967-1982 (1985).
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hours. Tension between Israel and Syria engendered friction
between Israel and Egypt. This led to threats by Israel to in-
vade Syria. 3 Egypt asked the United Nations to remove a
peacekeeping force it maintained on the Egyptian side of the
Israel-Egypt frontier, explaining that Egypt may need to move
against Israel "the moment [Israel] might carry out any aggres-
sive action against any Arab country."4 This was an apparent
reference to the possibility that Israel might invade Syria. The
United Nations asked Israel if it wanted the peacekeeping force
moved to its side of the border as protection against a possible
invasion. Israel declined the offer, and the United Nations re-
moved its troops.5 Egypt then moved troops up to the frontier
but made no obvious preparations for an imminent invasion of
Israel.
On June 4, 1967, Israel's cabinet authorized the Israel De-
fense Force to invade Egypt.6 After invading Egypt the next
day,7 Jordan reacted by shelling Israeli territory. Israeli troops
then pushed eastward through the old city of Jerusalem (East
Jerusalem) to the Jordan River occupying East Jerusalem and
the rest of the West Bank. Israeli troops also occupied the Gaza
Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.
Both Egypt and Israel claimed that the other struck first.8
Egypt said that the first move was Israel's aerial bombing of
Egyptian military aircraft on the ground at Egypt's home bases.
Israel said that the first move was Egypt's shelling of three
3 See Charles Yost, How the Arab-Israeli War Began, 46 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
304, 307 (1967) (threatening by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to invade
Syria); Amos Shapira, The Six-Day War and the Right of Self-Defense, 6 ISRAEL L.
REV. 65, 66 (1971) (quoting the official Israeli Weekly News Bulletin (Government
of Israel), May 9-15, 1967, at 20); U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., Supp., April-June 1967 at
90, U.N. Doc. S/7885 (1967) (complaining by Syria of Israel's threats in a May 15,
1967 letter to the President of the Security Council).
4 INDAR JIT RIKHYE, THE SINAI BLUNDER: WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS EMERGENCY FORCE LEADING TO THE SIX-DAY WAR OF JUNE 1967 16 (1980).
5 U.N. GAOR, 5th Emergency Special Sess., Annex, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/6730/
Add. 2 (1967) (indicating that the Secretary-General offered to Israel to move the
peacekeepers from the Egyptian to the Israeli side of the frontier, but Israel
declined).
6 See Asher Wallfish, Meir Reveals Text of War Decision, JERUSALEM POST,
June 5, 1972, at 1.
7 See RITCHIE OVENDALE, THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 180 (Harry
Hearder, ed., 1984).
8 See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1347th mtg. at 1-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967).
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southern Israeli villages and approach of Egyptian jet aircraft
towards Israel.9 Egypt in fact had not shelled into Israel, and
its planes had not left their bases but were destroyed there by
Israel's air force.10
A month later, Israel's Prime Minister admitted that Israel
struck first but claimed it acted in "legitimate defense," expect-
ing an Egyptian attack.11 However, other members of the Is-
raeli cabinet said that the cabinet was well informed on the
state of Egypt's preparedness but did not expect Egypt to in-
vade Israel when it decided to invade Egypt. 12 Therefore, Israel
was not justified in its attack on Egypt, and Jordan acted in
lawful defense of Egypt when it initiated hostilities with
Israel. 13 The United Nations bodies that have dealt with this
situation have stated no conclusion on legal responsibility for
the 1967 hostilities.
B. Construction of Settlements
Starting in 1967, Israel encouraged Israelis to settle first in
the West Bank and later in Gaza. Using land confiscation
laws, 14 Israel acquired substantial tracts of land, particularly in
the West Bank. 15 Israel also provided financial incentives to po-
9 See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1348th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (1967)
(Mr. Eban stated, "Egyptian forces engaged us by air and land, bombarding the
[Israeli] villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz and Ein Hashelosha.... ." and "approaching
Egyptian aircraft appeared on our radar screens...
10 See OVENDALE, supra note 7, at 180.
11 Admission on Attack, TIMES (London), July 8, 1967, at 3 (statement of
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol).
12 Le gdndral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb.
29, 1968, at 1 (quoting Itzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff, that the troops Egypt brought
up to the frontier "would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against
Israel. He knew it and we knew it."); Excerpts from Begin Speech at National De-
fense College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1982, at A6 (Menachem Begin, a cabinet minis-
ter in 1967, stating that Egypt's troop movements "[did] not prove that Nasser was
really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack
him.").
13 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4; U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
14 See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN ISRAELI-OC-
CUPIED WEST BANK AND GAzA 4-8 (1978); RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL
AND THE WEST BANK 15-49 (1985); RAJA SHEHADEH & JONATHAN KUTTAB, THE
WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW 107-12 (1980).
15 See MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF
ISRAEL'S POLICIES 30-36 (1984); ANTOINE MANSOUR, PALESTINE: UNE ECONOMIE DE
RESISTANCE EN CISJORDANIE ET A GAZA 34-37 (1983).
1998]
5
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tential settlers in the form of grants or below-market mortgage
rates. Under the Labor Party government of the time, settle-
ment construction was predicated on a stated principle of set-
tling certain sectors to promote Israel's security.
The stated purpose of settlement construction was ex-
panded by the Likud Party government that took office in 1977.
Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin said, " Judea and Sa-
maria . .. are part of the land of Israel, where the nation was
born." 16 Since Judea and Samaria are ancient names for sec-
tions of the West Bank, Begin's usage bespoke a territorial
claim. 17 The Likud Party considered the West Bank to belong
to Israel on the ground that it formed part of the ancient He-
brew kingdom in Palestine. Unlike the Labor Party, the Likud
Party asserted a right for Israel to establish settlements any-
where in the occupied territories.
In a court action by Palestinian landowners challenging the
construction of one settlement in the West Bank, the Supreme
Court of Israel said that the Israeli cabinet's approval of the
settlement was "decisively influenced by reasons stemming
from the Zionist world-view of the settlement of the whole land
of Israel."' 8 Judge Moshe Landau cited an affidavit of the At-
torney General that quoted Begin as affirming "the Jewish peo-
ple's right to settle in Judea and Samaria .... ,,
Upon taking office in 1983, Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir vowed to pursue what he called the "holy work" of set-
tlement.20 Officials acknowledged that settlement construction
was aimed at creating a presence to prevent the Palestine
Arabs from forming a state. 2' In 1983, the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and the World Zionist Organization, a quasi-governmental
body, jointly prepared a Master Plan and Development Plan for
Settlement in Samaria and Judea.22 The plan's stated goal was
16 William Claiborne, Israel Turns to West Bank, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1982,
at Al.
17 Id. See also Emergency Regulations Law, 1977, 32 L.S.I. 58, (1977-78).
18 H.C. 390/79, 17 Residents of the Village of Rujeib v. Government of Israel,
34(1) P.D. 1, reprinted in 1 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L., 134, 145 (1984).
19 1 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L., supra note 18, at 146.
20 DAVID HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH: THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 453 (1984).
21 See SARA Roy, THE GAZA STRIP: A DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
LEGAL SURVEY 137 (1986); BENVENISTI, supra note 15, at 49-63.
22 See BENVENISTI, supra note 15, at 19-28.
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"to disperse maximally large Jewish population in areas of high
settlement priority, using small national inputs and in a rela-
tively short period by using the settlement potential of the West
Bank and to achieve the incorporation [of the West Bank] into
the [Israeli] national system."23
Beginning in 1989, the mass influx of immigrants from the
Soviet Union to Israel lent a new impetus to settlement activity.
The government settled many of the new arrivals in East Jeru-
salem. Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, said that Israel
should "bring as many immigrants to the city as possible and
make it an overwhelmingly Jewish city, so that [the Palestini-
ans] will get it out of their heads that Jerusalem will not be
Israel's capital."24 The Jerusalem Development Authority, a
government corporation, built new blocks of apartment build-
ings in East Jerusalem to settle immigrating Jews. 25
The Labor Party government that entered office in 1992 in-
dicated that it planned to build less expansively by reducing the
financial incentives given to settlers. 26 At the same time, how-
ever, it continued construction at significant levels.27 A group
of Israelis who opposed the maintenance of settlements chal-
lenged them in the Supreme Court of Israel, but the court de-
clined to rule on what it considered a political issue.28
C. Settlement Construction Since the Israel-P.L.O.
Agreements
Settlement construction did not end with the onset of Is-
raeli-Palestinian political collaboration in 1993. Since that
time, settlement-housing construction has focused on sectors of
the West Bank adjacent to East Jerusalem and in East Jerusa-
lem itself. The apparent aim, according to an Israeli human
23 Id. at 27.
24 Editorial, The Battle for Jerusalem, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 22, 1990, at 4.
25 See Joost R. Hiltermann, Settling for War: Soviet Immigration and Israel's
Settlement Policy in East Jerusalem, 20 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 71, 77-78
(1991).
26 See Jose Rosenfeld & Herb Keinon, Ministry Changes List of Areas Receiv-
ing Housing Incentives, JERUSALEM POST, July 6, 1993 (news section).
27 See AwAD MANSOuR, CLEVER CONCEALMENT: JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNDER THE RABIN GOVERNMENT: AUGUST 1992-SEPTEMBER
1993 1-2 (1994).
28 See Evelyn Gordon, Peace Now Petition Against Settlement-Building Re-
jected, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 26, 1993 (news section).
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rights organization, is "to create a demographic and geographic
reality that will preempt any future effort to challenge Israeli
sovereignty in East Jerusalem."29
When Israel announced in 1995 that it would expropriate
new tracts of land in East Jerusalem to build housing for Jews,
the U.N. Security Council met regarding this matter. During
the Security Council debate, the U.K. delegate said that Israel
should "refrain from taking actions which seek to change the
status quo on this most sensitive of all issues before the conclu-
sion of the final-status negotiations." 30 Other delegates also ex-
pressed a concern that the land seizures were intended to pre-
empt the Palestinian claim to East Jerusalem. 31 Fourteen of
the Council's fifteen members voted in favor of a draft resolu-
tion condemning the plan, but the draft failed due to a United
States veto.32 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin later an-
nounced that Israel would suspend the expropriations, but he
avoided making a commitment not to resume them.33
In 1996, the Jerusalem District Planning Committee, an
arm of the Jerusalem municipality, announced a plan to build
housing for 132 Jewish families in Ras al-Amud, an Arab neigh-
borhood in East Jerusalem. The plan drew international pro-
tests, including one from the President of the U.N. Security
Council. The Jerusalem municipal council nonetheless ap-
proved the plan. However, the government, apparently out of
concern over the international repercussions, indicated it would
not act on the plan.34
29 B'TSELEM, A POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION: LAND EXPROPRIATION, PLANNING
AND BUILDING IN EAST JERUSALEM 9 (1997).
30 U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3538 (1995) (quot-
ing Sir David Hannay of the United Kingdom).
31 See U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., supra note 30, at 3 (Mr. Lavrov, Russian Feder-
ation); id. at 4 (Mr. Wisnumurti, Indonesia); id. at 5 (Mr. Fulci, Italy); id. at 8 (Mr.
Mrime, France).
32 See U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3538th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV/3538 (1995).
See U.S. Vetoes a Condemnation in U.N. of Israeli Land Seizure, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 1995, at A10.
33 See VOICE OF ISRAEL RADIO, Rabin Holds News Conference on Land Expro-
priation Decision, (May 22, 1995), (in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, May
24, 1995), available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS File.
34 See Batsheva Tsur, A-G: It's Possible to Block Building in Ras al-Amud,
JERUSALEM POST, July 30, 1997, at 2, available in NEXIS, World Library,
ALLNWS File; See Ross Dunn, Israeli Block on Building Opens Way to Talks,
TIMES (London), July 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, TTimes File.
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In 1997, the number of Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip
and West Bank, including East Jerusalem, reached 300,000.
That year, Israel's government announced plans to construct
6500 units of housing for Jews in the Jebel Abu Ghneim section
of East Jerusalem. This projected settlement, which Israel
planned to name Har Homa, was designed to complete a string
of settlements between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West
Bank, and thus to cut off East Jerusalem.3 5 Israel's Minister of
Internal Security, Avigdor Kahalani, said that an aim of the
new construction was to "make unequivocally clear that Jerusa-
lem is the Jewish capital, and we can build within its municipal
boundaries." 36 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, seeking
to justify the construction, said that Jews held title to much of
the land involved. 37
Again, the U.N. Security Council met. A European-spon-
sored resolution was proposed to condemn Israel's settlement
plan as illegal and a "major obstacle to peace." Again, fourteen
of the Council's fifteen members voted in favor of the draft reso-
lution, but again the United States vetoed.38 The General As-
sembly then took up the matter and adopted as its own
resolution the draft that had failed in the Security Council.
This resolution asked Israel "to refrain from all actions or meas-
ures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on
the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations, and have
negative implications for the Middle East peace process."39
When Israel actually began the construction of the Har
Homa settlement, the Security Council took up a draft resolu-
tion to demand that Israel "immediately cease construction of
35 See Open Statement Concerning the Current Political Situation, A1-Haq
(Ramallah), March 20, 1997 (copy on file with author).
36 Patrick Cockburn, Jews Given Swathe of Arab East Jerusalem for Homes,
THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 27, 1997, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Indpnt File.
37 VOICE OF ISRAEL RADIO, Netanyahu Phones Egyptian President Mubarak on
Har Homa Construction, (Feb. 26, 1997), (in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Feb. 28, 1997), available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTMDE File.
38 See U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3747th mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3747 (1997).
See also Paul Lewis, U.S. Vetoes U.N. Criticism of Israel's Construction Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, March 8, 1997, at A3.
39 G.A. Res. 51/223, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 93rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/
L.68/Add.1 (1997); See Paul Lewis, Israel's Plan for Jerusalem is Condemned by
Assembly, N.Y. TimEs, March 14, 1997, at A12.
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the Jebel Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as
all other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territo-
ries." The draft received thirteen affirmative votes but was ve-
toed by the United States.40
In casting vetoes, the United States expressly stated that
its opposition to the veto was not based on support for the con-
struction and settlement activity. Rather, U.S. opposition pro-
ceeded from the premise that in light of the ongoing bilateral
process between Israel and the P.L.O., the U.N. was not the
"proper forum" for addressing the matter. As stated by the U.S.
delegate, "the parties themselves are those that should deal
with these very, very important issues."4 1
Concerned over the Security Council's inability to act, how-
ever, the U.N. General Assembly convoked a special session to
address Israel's settlement construction. The Assembly
adopted a resolution reiterating its condemnation of the con-
struction of Har Homa and, significantly, asking states to re-
frain from giving aid to Israel that might be used for the
construction.42 This resolution was implicitly aimed at the
United States as the only state giving aid to Israel. The call
was in line with resolutions in earlier years in which the Secur-
ity Council and General Assembly asked Israel to end settle-
ment construction. 43
By mid-1997 no action had been taken by Israel to stop con-
struction of the Har Homa settlement. Subsequently, the Gen-
eral Assembly held yet another special session on the issue. By
40 See U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3756th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3756 (1997)
(Costa Rica abstaining). See also Security Counsel Again Fails to Adopt Resolu-
tion on Israeli Settlement, U.N. Security Council, Press Release SC/6345, March
21, 1997; Paul Lewis, U.S. Again Vetoes a Move by U.N. Condemning Israel, N.Y.
TIMES, March 22, 1997, at A4.
41 Rena Slama, Washington to Veto Resolution Again on Settlement, AGENCE
FRANCE PREssE, March 22, 1997 available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS
File.
42 See G.A. Res. ES-10/2, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Special Sess., 3rd plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/L.1/Add. 1. See also Israel Warned to Halt New
Housing for Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1997, at A4.
43 See S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., S/RES/465 (1980) (asking states
"not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with
settlements in the occupied territories"). See also G.A. Res. 35/122C, U.N. GAOR,
35th Sess., 92nd plen. mtg., (1980), U.N. Doc. A/AC.183/1.2/Add. 2 (1982) (asking
states "to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by
Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization").
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a new resolution, the General Assembly called on states to dis-
courage activities that directly contribute to Israel's settlement
construction in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem,
even if those activities are those of private economic actors. The
Assembly also called on Israel to provide information on goods
produced in its settlements, so that other states may determine
if their nationals are involved.44
III. LEGALITY OF ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS
The Gaza Strip and the West Bank fall under a legal re-
gime called belligerent occupation. Belligerent occupation
arises whenever a foreign army occupies territory, whether that
army acted aggressively or defensively.
A. Belligerent Occupation and Settlements
Importantly, occupation of foreign territory does not yield
rights of sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty over the territory
is separate from the issue of control exercised by the occupant.
For example, when France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and
the United States jointly occupied Germany after World War II,
these four states acquired no sovereign rights. Similarly, when
Iraq occupied Kuwait in 1990, it gained control, but not sover-
eignty. When it withdrew in 1991 it ceded control. Kuwait held
sovereignty at all relevant times. Even if an occupant purports
to annex the territory, as Iraq did with Kuwait, it does not gain
sovereignty. 45
Belligerent occupation is subject to a body of international
law regulating the rights and obligations of all parties involved.
The law of belligerent occupation protects an occupied popula-
tion, while ceding to the occupying power a certain flexibility of
action to preserve its temporary tenure. The law of belligerent
occupation operates on the premise that the occupying power is
in a position of predominance with respect to the occupied popu-
lation. Therefore, the occupied population needs international
protection.
4See G.A. Res. ES-10/3, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emergency Special Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/ES-10IL.2/Rev.1 (1997).
4. See S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/
662 (1990) (stating "that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq... has no legal validity,
and is considered null and void").
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The law of belligerent occupation is found in customary in-
ternational law, the 1907 Hague Regulations, 46 and the 1949
Geneva Civilians Convention.4 7 The Hague Regulations are
widely viewed as having entered the corpus of customary law,
and Israel shares that view.48 The law of belligerent occupation
requires an occupying power to preserve the existing order to
the extent feasible, in the expectation that it will ultimately
withdraw. It must preserve the "civil life" of the territory49 and
apply existing legislation as the law in force.50
An occupying power normally does not settle its own citi-
zens in the occupied territory. For example, the four powers oc-
cupying Germany after World War II did not settle their
civilians in Germany. If, however, an occupying power has de-
signs on the territory, it may try to settle its nationals there.
Iraq did so in Kuwait in 1990. Germany did so in Eastern Eu-
rope during World War II. In sectors of Poland, Germany gave
Germans willing to settle incentives in the form of exemptions
from income, real estate, sales, and inheritance taxes. 51
Such settlement activities are illegal. An occupying power
must leave the territory to the population it finds there and may
not bring in its own people as settlers. Article 49 of the Geneva
Civilians Convention states, "[t]he Occupying Power, shall not
• . . transfer parts of its own civilian population into the terri-
tory it occupies." 52 The Hague Regulations do not address
transfer of civilians but contain provisions that prohibit use of
46 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art.
43, 36 Stat. 2277 (1910); reprinted in Charles I. Bevans, 1 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 631
(1968) [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
47 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Civilians
Convention].
48 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 43.
49 See Hague Regulations, supra note 45, art. 43 (the term "vie publique" in
the French, and only official, text of the Regulations).
50 See Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 47, at arts. 43 & 64.
51 See Order concerning Tax Abatement for the Benefit of the Incorporated
Eastern territories (Eastern Tax Abatement Order), Dec. 9, 1940, Reichsgesetz-
blatt, 1940, I, at 1565, excerpted in Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe:
Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress 225, 516-17
(Howard Fertig ed. 1973).
52 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 47, at art. 49.
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land in the occupied territory as a site for settlement construc-
tion. The Hague Regulations require the occupying power to
administer public lands to benefit the local population 53 and in-
struct it not to confiscate private property.54 Thus, use of either
public or private land for settlement construction is forbidden.
Since annexation violates the law of belligerent occupation,
such an occupant annexing the occupied territory does not le-
galize a transfer of population. Thus, Iraq's purported annexa-
tion of Kuwait did not legalize the status of Iraqi civilians it
brought into Kuwait. In 1967, Israel extended the applicability
of Israeli law to East Jerusalem, though not to the rest of the
West Bank.55 This action, which was viewed as a virtual an-
nexation of East Jerusalem, did not legalize the status of Israeli
civilians whom Israel brought into East Jerusalem. The Inter-
national Community condemned Iraq's purported annexation
and refused to recognize it.56
B. View of International Community
The international community considers Israel to be in vio-
lation of international standards for its settlement construction
activity. The 1997 U.N. resolutions cited above were not the
first to condemn Israel on the issue. The U.N. Security Council
earlier stated:
Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and
new immigrants in those territories [the territories occupied in
1967] constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War [Geneva Civilians Convention] and also constitute a serious
obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace
in the Middle East.57
53 See Hague Regulations, supra note 46, at art. 55.
54 See Hague Regulations, supra note 46, at art. 46.
55 See Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, 21 L.S.I.
75 (1967); Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment No. 6) Law, 21 L.S.I. 75 (1967).
Municipalities Ordinance (Declaration on the Enlargement of Jerusalem's City
Limits) 1967, K.T. 2065, 2694, reprinted in Order Unites Holy City, JERUSALEM
POST, June 29, 1967, at 1.
56 See S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1440th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC/183/
L.2 (1976) (condemning Israeli measures affecting Jerusalem as tantamount to an-
nexation, which the resolution found unlawful).
57 S.C. Res. 465, supra note 43.
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The General Assembly, also referring to the Geneva Civil-
ians Convention, "strongly condemn[ed] . . . [the]
[e] stablishment of new Israeli settlements and expansion of the
existing settlements on private and public Arab lands, and
transfer of an alien population thereto."5 s The U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights criticized Israel for the "settlement of
alien populations brought from other parts of the world in the
place of the original Palestinian owners of land," as a violation
of the rights of the Palestinian population.5 9
C. Arguments in Favor of the Legality of Israel's Settlements
Several contentions have been advanced on behalf of Israel
to suggest that the settlement construction did not violate the
law of belligerent occupation, and specifically Article 49 of the
Geneva Civilian's Convention.
1. Transfer
One contention was that the settlers themselves estab-
lished the settlements, and therefore that Israel had not "trans-
ferred" population. 60 An Israeli scholar writes:
one should differentiate between the transfer of people - which is
forbidden by Article 49 - and the voluntary settlement of nation-
als of the occupant, on an individual basis, in the occupied terri-
tory. Such settlement, if not carried out on behalf of the
occupant's Government and in an institutional fashion, is not nec-
essarily illegitimate. 61
Whatever the legal merit of this view, there has been little
or no settlement of this kind in the Gaza Strip or West Bank.
The settlement activity there has been government-backed to a
degree that renders this distinction unimportant. 62 The U.S.
Legal Adviser, in concluding that the settlements are unlawful,
58 G.A. Res. 37/88C, U.N. GAOR, 37th Special Political Committee, 37th
Sess., Supp. No. 51., 100th plen. mtg., at 93, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1983).
59 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1987/2, art. 8(e), U.N. ESCOR,
43d Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/1987/18, E/CN.4/1987/60 (1987).
60 See Julius STONE, ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
177-81 (1981).
61 Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and
Human Rights, 8 ISRAEL Y.B. ON H.R. 104, 124 (1978).
62 See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 140 (1993);
Jewish Settlers Get Big Part of Israeli Housing Budget, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
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has said that Article 49 "seems clearly to reach such involve-
ment of the occupying power as determining the location of set-
tlements, making land available and financing of
settlements. '63 He found the settlements to be "[i]n contraven-
tion of the generally accepted interpretation of the [Geneva Ci-
vilians] Convention's Article 49.'"64 The U.S. Legal Adviser said
that the settlements violated Article 49 as an unlawful "trans-
fer of parts of its own civilian population. 65
2. Displacement
It was also argued in Israel's defense that the Geneva Civil-
ians Convention prohibited settlement only to the extent that
settlement displaced local residents. 66 However, the text of Ar-
ticle 49 has no such limitation, and its drafting history contains
no hint of an intent that there be one. 67 The U.S. Legal Adviser
stated the view that local population be displaced before Article
49 is violated is incorrect, and that the Convention applies
"whether or not harm is done by a particular transfer." He fur-
ther states Article 49 provides "transfers of a belligerent occu-
pant's civilian population into occupied territory are broadly
proscribed as beyond the scope of interim military
administration." 68
3. Security
The third contention argued is that Israel was permitted
under the law of belligerent occupation to protect the security of
its temporary tenure, and the Israeli settlements served this
purpose. 69 Such a purpose was stated by the Labor Party to be
Aug. 4, 1997 AVAILABLE IN LEXIS, News Library (stating that settlers received 20%
of expenditures of Israeli housing ministry).
63 Opinion of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, 1980 Digest
1575, 1577.
64 U.S. Dept. of State, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1979 761 (1980).
65 Opinion of the Legal Adviser, supra note 63, at 1577.
66 See The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by Israel 54-55 (Israel Na-
tional Section, International Commission of Jurists, 1981).
67 See W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 264-65 (1986).
68 Opinion of the Legal Adviser, supra note 63, at 1577.
69 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 143-163.
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its objective. These settlements would create an Israeli pres-
ence in sectors of the occupied territories.
However, this justification was questionable on the follow-
ing two grounds. First, although an occupying power may pro-
tect its security, Article 49 appears to state no exceptions. Thus,
while an occupying power may, in general, take measures to
protect its security, it may not use civilian settlements as one of
those measures. Second, even if, in theory, settlement might be
justified on security grounds, the Israeli settlements did not
seem to serve that end. The negative reaction of the local Pales-
tinian population, engendered by the establishment of settle-
ments, seemed to exacerbate tensions and thus, arguably, to
worsen rather than improve Israel's security.
The U.S. Legal Adviser, referring to limits on an occupying
power under the customary law of belligerent occupation, said
that
"the civilian settlements in the territories occupied by Israel do
not appear to be consistent with these limits on Israel's authority
as belligerent occupant in that they do not seem intended to be of
limited duration or established to provide orderly government of
the territories, and, though some may serve incidental security
purposes, they do not appear to be required to meet military
needs during the occupation."70
4. Ownership of the Land
Another assertion made on Israel's behalf related to the
ownership of the land on which settlements were built. Some
land, like a portion of that projected in 1997 for construction of
the Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem, was owned by
Jews from a time prior to Israel's establishment. 71 Some settle-
ments were built on land confiscated from private Palestinian
landowners, while others were built on land that had been
state-owned prior to the occupation. 72 Much of the land in the
West Bank was held in an unclear type of tenure that theoreti-
cally involved the state as owner but, according to local custom
involved private ownership. After 1980, the Likud-led govern-
70 Id.
71 See Netanyahu Phones Egyptian President Mubarek on Har Homa Con-
struction, supra note 37.
72 See SHEHADEH, supra note 14, at 22.
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ment of the time began to consider these lands to be state-
owned and thus subject to being used for settlements without
regard to the rights of the person who, according to local cus-
tom, was the owner.73
The ownership status of a particular parcel of land is, how-
ever, irrelevant. The prohibition is against the insertion of ci-
vilians into the occupied territory. It matters not that the land
is state-owned. Regardless of whether the land involved was
public or private, the erection of settlements was illegal.
5. League of Nations Mandate
A further argument made in favor of the legality of the set-
tlements was that they are lawful under the mandate that
Great Britain held from the League of Nations to administer
Palestine after World War I. The argument was based on lan-
guage in the mandate instrument whereby Great Britain com-
mitted itself to promote a Jewish national home in Palestine. It
was said that this language gave Israel a right to settle Israelis
in any part of Palestine.74
This argument has found little approbation. The mandate
instrument spoke of a Jewish national home in Palestine, but
failed to specify what that meant, and whether that was to in-
clude the entire territory. Given that Palestinian Arabs formed
90% of the population at the time, and that the mandate instru-
ment also required Great Britain to do nothing to prejudice
their rights, it is unrealistic to argue that the instrument con-
templated Israel as having the entire territory.
6. Applicability of Geneva Civilians Convention
Apart from debate about the meaning of Article 49, Israel
argued that the Geneva Civilians Convention did not, in any
event, apply to its control of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
The convention by its terms applies only in "the territory of a
High Contracting Party."75 Israel contends that only a sover-
73 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 153.
74 See Eugene Rostow, "Palestinian Self-Determination:" Possible Futures for
the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 147, 159 (1979); Eugene Rostow, Don't Strongarm Israel, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 19, 1991, at A23.
75 See Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2.
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eign may be a contracting party lawfully holding territory and
bound by Article 49. Israel further contended that Jordan was
not sovereign in the West Bank, and Egypt was not sovereign in
Gaza.76
Egypt never claimed sovereignty in Gaza but considered it
to be part of Palestine as previously constituted, even though
Palestine had ceased to function.7 7 Jordan did claim sover-
eignty in the West Bank subject to possible later developments
in the direction of self-determination for the Palestinians. 78
However, its claim was not generally recognized. Despite the
facts that Gaza was not under Egypt's sovereignty and Jordan's
claim to sovereignty was unclear, Israel's view on the applica-
bility of the Geneva Civilians Convention was rejected by the
international community, 79 including the United States.80 The
Geneva Civilians Convention states that it applies "in all cir-
76 See Amb. Netanel Lorch, Statement at Symposium on Human Rights,
Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON H.R. 366 (1971); Yehuda Z.
Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3
ISRAEL L. REVIEW 279 (1968); Military Prosecutor v. Halil Muhamad Mahmud
Halil Bakhis et al., v. Israel, Military Court Sitting in Ramallah, (June 10, 1968),
47 INT'L L. RpTS. 484 (1974) (the government and Supreme Court said that the
"humanitarian" provisions of the Convention - a category not found in the Con-
vention - would be applied but did not find 49 to be "humanitarian").
77 See Republican Decree Announcing Constitutional System of Gaza Sector,
March 9, 1962, art. 1, 17 MIDDLE EAST J. 156 (1963) (1962 constitution adopted for
Gaza by Egypt in 1962 stated: "The Gaza Strip is an indivisible part of the land of
Palestine."); Id. at art. 73 ("This constitution shall continue to be observed in the
Gaza Strip until a permanent constitution for the state of Palestine is issued.").
See also Carol Farhi, On the Legal Status of the Gaza Strip, 1 MILITARY GOVERN-
MENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980 61, 75 (1982).
78 See Albion Ross, Amman Parliament Vote Unites Arab Palestine and Trans-
jordan, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1950, at Al (Jordan's parliament specifying that in
incorporating the West Bank into Jordan, it acted "without prejudicing the final
settlement of Palestine's just case within the sphere of national aspirations, inter-
Arab co-operation and international justice").
79 See S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., Res. & Decs. 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/
22/Rev.2 (1968); G.A. Res. 2443, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess. at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1969); Wendy Olson, UN Security Council Resolutions Regarding Deportations
from Israeli Administered Territories: The Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 24 STANFORD
J. INT'L L. 611, 620 (1988).
80 See U.S. Dept. of State, United States Reaffirms Position on Jerusalem, 61
DEP'T ST. BULL. 76 (1969); Opinion of the Legal Adviser, supra note 64, at 1576;
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cumstances,"8' and to "all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict."8 2
D. Settlements Under the Israel-P.L.O. Agreements
None of the arguments made on Israel's behalf to justify the
settlements has been found persuasive by other states. The set-
tlements are viewed as unlawful under the law of belligerent
occupation. This law applies, so long as the occupant exercises
any authority.8 3 Thus, the rules of belligerent occupation have
continued in force during the period of the P.L.O.'s assumption
of partial authority in the occupied territories. In particular,
the prohibition against transfer of civilians remained in force.
In addition, the agreements concluded between Israel and
the P.L.O., beginning in 1993, may be relevant to the legality of
the settlements. Although the character of these agreements
has been the subject of controversy, the better view is that they
are international treaties.8 4 Israel took the view that its agree-
ments with the P.L.O. did not forbid it to expand settlements,
since these agreements do not expressly forbid such construc-
tion. The agreements contain no explicit prohibition related to
settlement construction.
However, the P.L.O. took the position that settlement con-
struction violated Article 5 of the 1993 Declaration of Principles
between Israel and itself.8 5 In that article, Israel and the
P.L.O. agreed to negotiate the status of the settlements by the
end of a transition period. The P.L.O. calling for compliance by
Israel demanded: "[c]essation of all actions that may preempt
negotiations on the final settlement, including the termination
of all colonial settlement activities, whether old or new."8 6
81 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 47, at art. 1.
82 Geneva Civilians Convention, supra note 47, at art 2.
83 See John Quigley, The Israel-PLO Agreements versus the Geneva Civilians
Convention, 7 PALESTINE Y. B. INT'L L. 45 (1992-94).
84 See John Quigley, The Israel-P.L.O. Interim Agreements: Are They Trea-
ties?, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
85 See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
Sept. 13, 1993, art. 5, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993).
86 Palestine & the UN (Monthly Bulletin issued by the Permanent Observer
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Under international law, parties must fulfill treaty obliga-
tions in good faith. Agreeing to resolve a contentious issue in
future negotiations, then undertaking measures that make the
issue less resolvable, arguably violates the requirement of fulfil-
ling an obligation in good faith.87
In another vein, it has been suggested that the Israel-
P.L.O. agreements legalize the settlements, since they stipulate
that, pending final negotiations, they shall be under Israeli con-
trol. Thus, the agreements appear to constitute an acknowledg-
ment by the P.L.O. of the legality of Israel's maintenance of the
settlements. However, these agreements also recognized that
each party held certain positions of principle regarding the ter-
ritories and said that nothing in the agreements affected those
claims. The 1994 and 1995 interim agreements each included a
statement of non-waiver of claims. The provision, identical in
the two agreements, read "[nleither Party shall be deemed, by
virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced
or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions."88 This
provision would seem to apply to the P.L.O.'s position that the
settlements are unlawful. By agreeing to Israel's temporary
control, the P.L.O. did not renounce its view that the settle-
ments are unlawful.
IV. STATUS OF ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS AT THE END OF
ITS OCCUPATION
A state that engages in an ongoing violation of an interna-
tional obligation is required to cease the violation. The rule as
stated by the International Law Commission is "[a] State whose
conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful act having a
continuing character is under the obligation to cease that con-
duct, without prejudice to the responsibility it has already in-
curred." 9 Since Israel's settlements were unlawful under the
law of belligerent occupation, it is under a continuing obligation
to dismantle them. Nothing changes in this regard upon termi-
87 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
88 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, supra note 14, art.
23(5); Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip art. 31(6).
89 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 43, Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10 at 142, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
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nation of the occupation. At that point in time, if the settle-
ments remain, Israel must dismantle them.
If, as some argue, the settlements can be justified on the
basis of protecting the security interests of Israel in the occu-
pied territory, then their existence would be lawful only so long
as such security interests exist. Those who make this argument
limit the security interest to security within the occupied terri-
tory, not security for the territory of Israel itself. They indicate
that in a peace agreement, the settlements would either be dis-
mantled or turned over.90
The law of belligerent occupation aims at protecting the
people who live in occupied territory. Thus, under the Geneva
Civilians Convention, the settlements violate the rights of the
occupied population, taking that population as a whole. Settle-
ments also violate the rights of the sovereign of the occupied
territory, as they are an unconsented insertion of a foreign
population.
As matters stand with the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and
as they will stand upon termination of the occupation, the
rights violated are those of Palestine, as the sovereign. A Pales-
tine state was declared, comprising the territory of the Gaza
Strip and West Bank, in 1988. This state has been widely rec-
ognized, as exemplified by Jordan's renouncement of its claim in
the West Bank in favor of Palestine.91
The Israeli settlements, were they to continue after an end
of the occupation, would be inconsistent with the rights of the
Palestine state. They are extraterritorial in the sense that they
are not subject to local administration, that only Israelis may
inhabit them, and that the settlers remain subject to the law of
Israel, rather than to local law.92 It would be a violation of the
rights of the Palestinian state for such an extraterritorial entity
to exist, unless one reverts to the notion of extraterritoriality as
practiced by Western powers in China, Turkey, and elsewhere a
century ago.
90 See COHEN, supra note 2, at 163.
91 See John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O.,
N.Y. TIMES, August 1, 1988, at Al; Excerpts from Hussein's address on abandoning
claims to the West Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at A4 ("The independent Pales-
tinian state will be established on the occupied Palestinian land after its
liberation.").
92 See SHEHADEH, supra note 14, at 91-95.
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V. STATUS OF ISRAEL'S SETTLERS AT END OF OCCUPATION
Given that maintenance of the settlements is unlawful for
Israel as a state, the question of the status of the settlers upon
termination of belligerent occupation remains. International
law typically protects the right of persons to remain in their ar-
eas of habitation. Under the law of nationality and human
rights law, nationals of a state have a right to reside there. If
sovereignty changes, individuals are not to be traded by states
at the discretion of the governing authorities. Individuals have
rights that continue even if sovereignty changes. 93
The entrance and continued stay of settlers during an occu-
pation violates the rights of the lawful sovereign. That sover-
eign has the right to determine who may immigrate; not the
state in control by virtue of belligerent occupation.
Civilians who settled in occupied territory, in violation of
the law of belligerent occupation, may be withdrawn unilater-
ally by the occupying army when it vacates the territory. Iraq,
for example, unlawfully moved Iraqi civilians into Kuwait dur-
ing its occupation in 1990-91. 9 4 When Iraqi troops withdrew,
these civilians apparently left with them.
If the matter is left to negotiation, evacuation would be pro-
vided for as part of the arrangement terminating the occupa-
tion. Such arrangement is similar to Israel's withdrawal from
the Sinai Peninsula in 1967. Israel took the Sinai Peninsula
from Egypt at the same time that it took the adjacent Gaza
Strip. In its Camp David treaty with Egypt, Israel agreed to
end its occupation of the Sinai and to evacuate its settlers.95
93 See U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 271, 272-275 (Annex: Report of
the Working Group on State Succession and its Impact on the Nationality of Natu-
ral and Legal Persons), U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995).
94 See Victor Mallet, Kuwait: Diary of an Occupation, FINANcIAL TIMES, Aug.
15, 1990, at 15 (quoting Amre Moussa, Egypt's U.N. delegate, as saying that Iraq
must remove civilians it has brought into Kuwait); Kuwaiti Says World Must
Stand by Jan. 15 Deadline, REUTERS, Dec. 18, 1990 (quoting Mohammed al-Sabah,
member of Kuwaiti government in exile, stating that Iraq was moving thousands
of Iraqis into Kuwait).
95 See Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of
Egypt, March 26, 1979, Annex I: Protocol concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Se-
curity Arrangements, art. 1, reprinted in 15 ISRAEL L. REV. 306 (1980) ("Israel will
complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later
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Albeit over the objection of some of the settlers, Israel fulfilled
this commitment by evacuating them.96
Israel's evacuation of settlers from the Sinai was consistent
with international practice. Nationals of an occupying power,
settling in the occupied territory have not been regarded as en-
titled to remain when the occupation ends. After Italy's with-
drawal at the end of World War I, Italians who settled in
territory occupied by Italy during the war were not entitled to
the nationality of the states in question. The post-war peace
treaty required states from whose territory Italy withdrew to
extend nationality to resident Italians. However, nationality
was only extended to those who were domiciled there as of June
10, 1940, the date on which Italy declared war on France and
Great Britain.9 7 This limitation excluded Italians who entered
under Italian occupation.98
Under the Potsdam protocol, Germans who settled in
nearby states whose territory Germany occupied during World
War II were forced out after the war. In addition, even the
Germans of long time residency inhabiting these states were
forced out.99 Thus, there was no special disposition for
Germans who settled during the war. While the removal of the
settlers was lawful, the removal of the others probably was
not. 100
After World War II, Austria excluded Germans who settled
in Austria during the war from Austrian citizenship. The the-
ory behind this action was that they were brought in by Ger-
many after it took Austria by force. In 1938 Germany annexed
Austria, abolishing Austrian nationality and thus made Aus-
trian nationals into German nationals. When Austria in 1945
again began to function as a state, it adopted a nationality law
that rolled the clock back, extending nationality to those who
96 See David K. Shipler, In Israel, Peace Seems Hollow After Sinai, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1982, at Al.
97 See Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy,
Feb. 10, 1947, art. 19(1), 49 U.N.T.S. 3.
98 See Yasuaki Onuma, Nationality and Territorial Change: In Search of the
State of the Law, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 20 (1981).
99 See Potsdam Conference Protocol, Aug. 2, 1945, sec. XII, 3 Bevans 1207
(calling for transfer to Germany of German populations in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary). See also Alfred de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam (1979).
100 See Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers,
16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 207, 227-42 (1975).
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held it in 1938, plus their descendants. This method of defining
Austrian nationality excluded Germans who settled in Austria
during the war.10 1
Latvia and Estonia attempted to follow Austria's example
when they re-emerged as states in the 1990s. They considered
the 1940 incorporation of their territories into the Soviet Union
an unlawful occupation. On that basis, they did not consider
persons who settled there after 1940 from other parts of the So-
viet Union to be entitled to nationality in the re-emerged Latvia
or Estonia. Lithuania, which was in a similar factual circum-
stance, could have made the same argument but did not. A Lat-
vian parliamentary official cited Austria's 1945 action as
precedent to argue that Latvia had been occupied and illegally
annexed by the U.S.S.R. Therefore the Soviet settlers were not
entitled to Latvian nationality.'0 2 Latvia extended nationality
only to persons who held it under pre-1940 Latvian law, or their
descendants.' 0 3 Estonia similarly extended nationality only to
persons who held it under a pre-1940 Estonian statute.'0 4
Latvia and Estonia met considerable pressure from west-
ern European institutions to extend nationality to persons who
settled after 1940, and as a result modified their approach.
While Europeans did not make their rationale clear, most did
not consider Latvia or Estonia to be under belligerent occupa-
tion after 1940, or to have been unlawfully annexed.
101 See Gesetz vom 10. Juli 1945 uber die Oberleitung in die 6sterreichische
Staatsbuirgerschaft (Staatsbuirgerschafts-Uberleitungsgesetz - St-O G) ?1, 1945
Staatsgesetzblatt ffir die Republik Osterreich 81 (no. 59).
102 See Letter of Andrejs Pantelejevs, Chairman, Human Rights and National-
ity Issues Committee, Republic of Latvia Supreme Council, to Jeri Laber, Execu-
tive Director, Helsinki Watch, Dec. 23, 1991, published in New Citizenship Laws in
the Republics of the former USSR, at 12.
103 See Republic of Latvia, Supreme Council, Resolution on the Renewal of Re-
public of Latvia Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization,
Oct. 15, 1991, 1-2, reprinted in Central & Eastern European Legal Materials (V.
Pechota ed. 1997). See also Human Rights in the Republic of Latvia: Report by
Jan De Meyer and Christos Rozakis (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe), 13 HuM. RTS. L.J. 244, 246 (1992).
104 See Republic of Estonia, Supreme Council, Resolution on the Application of
the Law on Citizenship, sec. 1, RT 1992, no. 7, item 109 (Feb. 26, 1992), unofficial
English translation available via Internet at http://www.vm.ee/laws/92citz.html;
discussed in Human Rights in the Republic of Estonia: Report by Raimo Pekkanen
and Hans Danelius (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) 13 HUMAN
RIGHTS L. J. 236, 239 (1992).
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This body of practice is consistent with the norms found in
the law of belligerent occupation that nationals of an occupying
power who settle in the occupied territory acquire no rights of
residency opposable against the sovereign. Israelis transferred
into the occupied territory during the occupation acquired no
rights there.
VI. RIGHTS OF ISRAEL'S SETTLERS UPON EVACUATION
Most of Israel's settlers are likely to evacuate if asked to do
so by the government of Israel. However, some may object, even
to the point of refusing to leave. Even though these settlers
have no right to reside in the occupied territory, they are not
without rights. They must be treated civilly by the authorities
having power over them. Thus, while the occupying power is
required to bring about their departure, it must do so in a hu-
mane manner. Settlers enjoy a right, as do all persons, to be
free of inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of govern-
mental authorities. 10 5 As a result of this obligation, an occupy-
ing power must facilitate evacuation under humane
circumstances. When Israel evacuated its settlers from the Si-
nai, it was able to do so without violence, despite the objections
of many of the settlers.1°6
The issue arises as to the real property of the settlers, and
other loss connected with being displaced. When Israel evacu-
ated its settlers from the Sinai, it compensated in amounts
ranging from $132,000 to $437,500 per family. 10 7 The issue of
compensating Gaza Strip and West Bank settlers for leaving
has been widely discussed in Israel. Since the commencement
of Israel-P.L.O. negotiations, many settlers have contemplated
a possibility of evacuating and some want government compen-
sation.108 Several members of Knesset parliament have called
on the government to allocate funds for this purpose. They have
made this call on the basis of their presumption that settlers
105 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
106 See Shipler, supra note 96, at Al.
107 See William Claiborne, Israel, Settlers Fail to Agree on Sinai Payments,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1982, at Al.
108 See Herb Keinon, Unsettled Settlers: Many Will Go if the Price is Right,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 10, 1993, at 2B.
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will depart, either in anticipation of or following a treaty with
the Palestinians. 10 9
It is not clear under these circumstances, whether compen-
sation is required as a matter of international law. There is a
right to one's property under international law. 110 This proba-
bly includes a right to compensation if the state takes the prop-
erty or, as here, forces a person to abandon it."' The matter
here is complicated by the fact that the establishment of the
settlements was unlawful and the settlers were likely aware of
that fact. Thus, the settlers understood that any rights they
might acquire in land or houses were of doubtful validity. On
the other hand, it was the government that encouraged these
civilians to settle, despite the illegality. Thus one might con-
clude that the government bears responsibility to them if it de-
prives them of rights granted under its authority. In any event,
Israel is likely to offer compensation, both out of considerations
of hardship for departing settlers and as an inducement to
leave.
VII. A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION
The P.L.O.-Israel Declaration of Principles calls for negoti-
ation of the following major outstanding issues between the two
parties: the status of Jerusalem, the fate of the displaced Pales-
tinians, a border between Israel and Palestine, and the settle-
ments." 2 According to the 1993 timetable, negotiations were to
commence during 1996, but difficulties between the parties
have led to a postponement. In the Declaration of Principles,
the parties agreed to take Security Council Resolution 242 as a
basis for negotiations. Such resolution asked Israel to with-
draw, in light of the prohibition against acquiring territory by
military force. 1 3
109 See Susan Hattis Rolef, Back to Green Line Israel, JERUSALEM POST, Jan.
15, 1996, at 6.
110 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
111 See Catarina Krause, The Right to Property, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CUL-
TURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 143, 151-152 (A. Eide, C. Krause & A. Rosas eds.,
1995).
112 See Declaration of Principles, supra note 85, at art. 5.
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Resolution 242 calls for peace arrangements between Israel
and its Arab neighbors. This leaves room for an argument that
the peace and withdrawal were conditional on each other.
Israel has now concluded peace agreements with Egypt and Jor-
dan. Resolution 242 was adopted before Israel began any sub-
stantial settlement activity. The resolution does not mention
the settlements.
It is against the background of the legal principles analyzed
in this article that Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation will negotiate regarding the settlements. A lawful out-
come would see the settlements either dismantled or turned
over to Palestine. Palestinian landowners would be compen-
sated. Settlers would be evacuated and, like anyone else, they
may apply for immigration to Palestine.
Only an outcome that is consistent with international legal
principles is likely to hold in the long term. This outcome will
not be easy to achieve, because Israel appears committed to
maintaining the settlements. Israel's defense minister, Yitzhak
Mordechai, said that his government's policy of settling the
Gaza Strip and West Bank satisfies "natural needs" and pro-
vides for "necessary growth. 11 4 Prime Minister Netanyahu
also expressed his commitment to expanding settlements and
has followed through on that commitment. 115
Israel, moreover, enjoys an economic and military prepon-
derance that may allow it to dictate terms. Short of dictating
terms, Israel might make a concession on some other issue, per-
haps the status of Jerusalem. A return commitment might al-
low some settlements to remain, perhaps with Israeli rule over
the territory in which the settlements are located.
The matter is not entirely up to the two parties, however.
The United Nations takes international peace as its primary
task. The Israeli settlements are viewed by virtually all govern-
ments, with the exception of Israel's, as an obstacle to peace.
Criticism of them on that basis has appeared repeatedly in in-
ternational instruments.
114 Hillel Kutler, State Dept. Decries PM Aide's Comment, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 18, 1996 at 1.
115 See David Makovsky, US Worried Over Future Settlement Drive, JERUSA-
LEM POST, Dec. 5, 1996, at 1.
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These are not idle words. Under Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter, member states that are on the Security Council bear a
collective legal obligation to deal with any threat to peace.
Thus, the U.N. has played a significant role in this issue since
the beginning of Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip and West
Bank.
Shortly after the occupation began, the U.N. General As-
sembly established a permanent committee to monitor Israel's
treatment of the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and West Bank,
called the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Af-
fecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied
Territories. 116 One of the prime topics followed by the Special
Committee has been that of Israel's settlements.
The General Assembly has reviewed the situation regard-
ing the settlements on an annual basis and has adopted, year
after year, resolutions criticizing Israel regarding the settle-
ments. The most far-reaching of these called on states that give
aid to Israel to avoid giving aid that allows Israel to violate the
Geneva Civilians Convention. The Security Council asked
states "not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used spe-
cifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territo-
ries."'117 The General Assembly asked states "to avoid actions,
including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel
in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization."' 18
Since the Israel-P.L.O. inter-action began, the United
States has pressured Israel to stop expanding settlements." 9
However, the United States has refused to take the step urged
by the United Nations of withholding aid, which helps Israel
expand settlements. In connection with the Israeli 1997 plan to
construct the Har Homa settlement in East Jerusalem, the
General Assembly and Security Council have met repeatedly.
The international community prefers to avoid being put in
the situation of having to respond to an unlawful provision
about settlements in a treaty concluded between the parties.
Anticipating their obligations under the U.N. Charter, other
116 See G.A. Res. 2443, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
117 S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1981).
118 G.A. Res. 35/122C, Art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., at 90, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1980).
119 See Makovsky, supra note 115, at 1.
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states are taking an interest in the Israel-P.L.O. negotiations
before the fact, to ensure a lawful outcome. This interest is re-
flected in the Security Council and General Assembly action re-
counted above.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The tie of individuals to the territory of their long-time
habitation is normally protected under international law. An
exception arises, however, when territory is taken by force of
arms and the state newly in control brings in its civilians to
settle. Such settlements are not lawful under international
law. The state that founded them is in violation of its
obligations.
The tenure of the nationals who inhabit settlements is tied
to that of the occupant. As a result, they acquire no rights that
can be asserted against the occupied population, or against the
state that holds sovereignty.
If the international norms here elaborated inform the nego-
tiations between Israel and the P.L.O. regarding the settle-
ments, there will be greater likelihood that the negotiated
solution will last. The international community bears a respon-
sibility to ensure an outcome consistent with the legal rights of
the parties. If the matter is left exclusively to the parties, there
is a serious risk of an inappropriate outcome. That would be
unfortunate for the inhabitants of the region. It would also in-
crease the likelihood that the international community, which
has dealt with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for half a century,
will face many more years of turmoil in the region.
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